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Abstract
Background: For a regional project in four low-incidence states, we designed a customizable
tuberculosis outbreak response plan. Prior to dissemination of the plan, a tuberculosis outbreak
occurred, presenting an opportunity to perform a field assessment of the plan. The purpose of the
assessment was to ensure that the plan included essential elements to help public health
professionals recognize and respond to outbreaks.
Methods: We designed a semi-structured questionnaire and interviewed all key stakeholders
involved in the response. We used common themes to assess validity of and identify gaps in the
plan. A subset of participants provided structured feedback on the plan.
Results:  We interviewed 11 public health and six community stakeholders. The assessment
demonstrated that (1) almost all of the main response activities were reflected in the plan; (2) the
plan added value by providing a definition of a tuberculosis outbreak and guidelines for
communication and evaluation. These were areas that lacked written protocols during the actual
outbreak response; and (3) basic education about tuberculosis and the interpretation and use of
genotyping data were important needs. Stakeholders also suggested adding to the plan questions
for evaluation and a section for specific steps to take when an outbreak is suspected.
Conclusion: An interactive field assessment of a programmatic tool revealed the value of a
systematic outbreak response plan with a standard definition of a tuberculosis outbreak, guidelines
for communication and evaluation, and response steps. The assessment highlighted the importance
of education and training for tuberculosis in low-incidence areas.
Background
Tuberculosis (TB) is a treatable disease that causes consid-
erable morbidity and mortality throughout the world,
accounting for nearly nine million new cases and two mil-
lion deaths in 2005 alone [1]. Controlling TB requires
integrated public health and medical systems that serve
the entire population. The United States has witnessed
decreasing TB incidence since 1992, with 2006 marking
the lowest number of cases (13,779 cases, 4.6 per 100,000
population) ever reported in this country [2]. Although
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the idea of eliminating TB in the U.S. (TB case rate < 1 per
1,000,000 population by 2010) had been discussed for
decades [3,4], the recent decline in TB, after a brief resur-
gence in the mid-1980s to early 1990s, has given new
impetus to this possibility [5,6].
Areas of low-incidence (≤ 3.5 cases per 100,000 popula-
tion), where achievement of TB elimination would seem
most likely, present distinct challenges to TB control
including: (a) variability of local resources; (b) lack of
public health and clinical TB experience; and (c) geo-
graphic barriers that may present difficulties for individu-
als seeking medical care [6,7]. These factors contribute to
delayed recognition of infectious TB cases and higher fre-
quency of outbreaks which have been increasingly
reported [8-13]. Regional approaches may offer an inno-
vative way to respond to these difficulties [6,7].
Four low-incidence states, Idaho, Montana, Utah, and
Wyoming (2006 regional incidence rate = 1.30 cases per
100,000 population [2]), participate in a project that aims
to enhance capacity among state and local health depart-
ments for controlling TB through participation in regional
activities and utilization of standardized tools. Although
the states differ in their TB-related epidemiology and
organizational structures, they share the challenges of
ensuring TB care and control in the context of decreasing
TB expertise and competition for resources.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
strongly encourages all states to have a written TB out-
break response plan (ORP) for the purpose of ensuring
comprehensive and timely response in order to interrupt
TB transmission. Many states, especially those with few TB
cases, do not currently have such plans. To address the
stated need for a written plan for TB outbreaks, we
designed a model ORP based on existing plans for TB and
other communicable diseases and key informant inter-
views with local, state, and national TB experts. Represent-
atives from the four low-incidence states and the Division
of Tuberculosis Elimination (DTBE), CDC also provided
input. The ORP is designed as a template permitting cus-
tomization by a specific jurisdiction.
Prior to dissemination of the ORP, we became aware of a
TB outbreak underway in Idaho. The outbreak presented
an opportunity to perform a field assessment to validate
and refine the tool. During October 2005–February 2006,
four cases of TB disease were reported in Boise. Three of
the patients were homeless and all four patients had
matching Mycobacterium tuberculosis genotypes by spacer
oligonucleotide (spoligotyping), mycobacterial inter-
spersed repetitive unit analysis, and restriction fragment
length polymorphism analysis. The (local) district TB pro-
gram led the outbreak response, while the state TB pro-
gram and CDC provided technical assistance and
laboratory services. Other states in the area were alerted
and genotyping information was provided. A TB-specific
plan was not used to guide response activities. In April
2006, three investigators visited the area to conduct an
assessment of the ORP. The purpose of the assessment
was to ensure that the plan included essential elements to
help TB professionals recognize and respond to out-
breaks. We were also interested in learning what educa-
tion and training needs arose during the outbreak.
Methods
We followed recommended methods for conducting key
informant interviews [14]. Key informants were individu-
als who knew of or were involved in the outbreak, as iden-
tified by the state TB controller and district management
staff. The primary intent of the assessment was to enhance
a current, on-going public health activity (TB control), by
improving a specific tool to help public health staff
respond to TB outbreaks. Study participants were public
health professionals and community health and social
service providers; patient data were not used. Nonethe-
less, we followed procedure to ensure that participation
was voluntary, that the purpose of the assessment was
understood by participants, and that responses remained
confidential. Toward that end, when requesting appoint-
ments and again at the time of the interview, we informed
respondents that participation was voluntary and
explained the purpose and duration of the interview, the
benefits that could be expected from participation (i.e., an
improved ORP), and the confidential nature of the inter-
view.
We created and pilot-tested a questionnaire to guide the
interviews. In addition, we requested review of the ques-
tionnaire from a state epidemiologist who worked in a
related area of public health. Based upon experience
gained in the pilot and specific feedback on the instru-
ment, the questionnaire was finalized. The interview
questions were designed to discuss TB control, leadership,
and organizational issues previously identified as essen-
tial elements in the ORP, as well as identify gaps. In par-
ticular, we focused on the following elements:
identification of the outbreak, legal authority, notifica-
tion, roles and responsibilities, resources, communica-
tion, community partnerships, and evaluation. We
tailored questions as appropriate for the different groups
of interviewees (i.e., public health professionals and com-
munity health and social service providers), see Addi-
tional file 1.
We conducted semi-structured interviews in-person and
by phone when face-to-face meetings were not feasible
due to distance or time. Four state public health labora-
tory professionals provided a consensus response. TwoBMC Public Health 2007, 7:307 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/307
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respondents, one state and one national health official,
had seen earlier drafts of the ORP. All other interviews
were conducted without any prior knowledge of the plan.
In addition, we asked interviewees from the district, state,
and CDC TB programs to review the ORP and provide
structured feedback on specific sections (definition of a TB
outbreak, notification, local and state public health
responsibilities, communication, and evaluation). As we
estimated it would take several hours to appraise the ORP
and reply to the written questionnaire, we asked only a
subset of interviewees to participate in this phase of the
assessment.
Data extraction and analysis
We used an inductive process to identify and compare
concepts and insights from patterns in the data [15]. First,
two trained interviewers analyzed the interview tran-
scripts and independently color-coded responses to the
questions allowing the identification of themes. We then
compared the color-coding and independently derived
themes to generate a single list of themes. Differences in
opinion were resolved by consensus. Finally, we discussed
the themes with the state TB controller for validation,
comment, and clarification. What emerged was a final list
of central themes that was used as a basis for determining
whether these themes were represented and adequately
addressed in sections in the ORP.
Results
We interviewed all 17 stakeholders identified as being
involved with the response. Specifically, we interviewed
11 (65%) public health professionals (four state, six dis-
trict, and one national representative) and six (35%) com-
munity members (two physicians, two infection control
practitioners, and two homeless shelter employees), as
summarized in Table 1. We conducted all but two of the
interviews in-person.
Overall, the central themes from the outbreak response
that emerged during the key informant interviews were
reflected in sections of the original ORP (Table 2). Four of
the central themes (noted in italics below) are described
in more detail in order to illustrate characteristics of the
ORP. In particular, we describe the outbreak response
through participants' own accounts (the outbreak) and
then compare these accounts with guidance provided in
the original ORP (the ORP).
Of the seven public health interviewees who provided
structured feedback on the ORP, almost all agreed that the
ORP would have been useful to have had during the out-
break. The feedback included specific suggestions for
improving the ORP. These ideas, as well as comments
from the key informant interviews, helped us make the
final ORP more usable and relevant and are described
below.
Table 1: Key informants and their tuberculosis-related responsibilities
Jurisdiction/area Type of 
interview
Responsibilities
State In-person Provides consultation in clinical and public health matters
In-person Under unusual circumstances, serves as lead epidemiologist and liaison with the local health districts and 
the state public health laboratory. (Provided public health consultation during the TB outbreak while the TB 
controller was on leave of absence)
In-person Provides oversight for surveillance and control of communicable diseases, including TB
In-person* Provides TB-related laboratory services; is responsible for processing TB samples
District In-person Performs TB case and contact investigations; reports TB cases; and advises about isolation
In-person Provides TB-program oversight and supervises nurse TB case manager
In-person Issues media releases and manages website with TB-specific materials prepared by the epidemiologists
In-person In this situation, provided interim management of epidemiologic activities
In-person Manages TB cases and provides treatment for latent TB infection
In-person Performs TB case and contact investigations and reports TB cases
CDC Phone Provides technical assistance in TB control and prevention to nine states in the Pacific Northwest and 
Rocky Mountains. CDC provides state funding for TB prevention and control activities
Community In-person Provides patient care and consultation
In-person Provides patient care and consultation
Phone Coordinates hospital infection control
In-person Coordinates hospital infection control
In-person Facilitates TB education
In-person Facilitates TB education; participates in TB clearance program
* Four laboratory professionals provided a consensus response. CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; TB, tuberculosis.BMC Public Health 2007, 7:307 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/307
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Central themes
Identification of the outbreak relied on both epidemiologic methods 
and genotyping information
The outbreak
Most respondents were aware of the outbreak and
described in "real time" how the outbreak was recognized.
Four of the six district respondents identified the outbreak
through traditional epidemiologic methods and two
respondents were uncertain how the outbreak was first
recognized. The district began taking local action when
staff identified homelessness as a common risk factor
among the TB patients. The CDC respondent and all four
state respondents became aware of the outbreak as a result
of reviewing genotyping information that indicated
matching TB strains. This in turn led state epidemiologists
to investigate the situation further by reviewing epidemi-
ologic data with district staff. The state and CDC subse-
quently alerted other states within the region. A standard
TB outbreak definition had not been used and there
appeared to be disagreement among some respondents
about whether and when an outbreak had actually
occurred. Most respondents felt that a standard TB out-
break definition might help with early recognition of
future TB outbreaks and coordination of response activi-
ties.
The ORP
Understanding that definitions of a TB outbreak are rela-
tive to the local context, the ORP proposes a TB outbreak
definition which incorporates both epidemiologic meth-
ods and genotyping information, Figure 1. The ORP
explains that outbreak cases can be distinguished from
other cases only when certain associations in time, loca-
tion, patient characteristics, or Mycobacterium tuberculosis
attributes (e.g., drug resistance or genotype) become
apparent. The ORP recommends that in low-incidence
jurisdictions, any temporal cluster of cases should be con-
sidered suspicious for an outbreak.
Communication relied on multiple channels, both formal and 
informal
The outbreak
We were interested in determining who served as the lead
spokesperson with different audiences (e.g., community
health providers, the public, and TB professionals from
other states in the region) and whether written guidelines
Table 2: Selected themes identified during key informant interviews
Themes Related section(s) in the outbreak 
response plan
Observations
Identification of the outbreak relied on both 
epidemiologic methods and genotyping 
information.
Definition of a TB outbreak; ten steps to take 
when an outbreak is suspected; exceptional TB 
circumstances; data management; glossary
The district became aware of the outbreak by 
epidemiologic methods; the state, by 
genotyping matches. A standard TB outbreak 
definition was not used.
Legal authority for responding to the outbreak 
was clearly established.
Legal authority; indications for initiating the 
plan; de-activation of the TB outbreak response 
plan
All respondents agreed that legal authority for 
the outbreak rested with the district; a TB-
specific plan was not used to guide the 
response.
Technical assistance was requested when the 
outbreak was first identified.
Notification and request for assistance The state TB program notified the Division of 
TB Elimination, CDC, allowing technical 
assistance to be deployed in a timely manner.
Additional resources were needed to respond 
to the outbreak.
Composition of the outbreak response team; 
public health roles and responsibilities; sources 
of additional staffing; training and education
In low-incidence areas, multiple roles are often 
filled by one individual; additional employees 
from other public health programs were 
brought in to help with the outbreak, but 
lacked TB training.
Communication relied on multiple channels, 
both formal and informal.
Guidelines for internal and external 
communication; risk communication checklist
The state TB controller and district 
epidemiologists communicated using standard 
operating procedures with health professionals; 
however, within the public health sector, staff 
relied on informal mechanisms for 
communication across multiple jurisdictions.
Contributions by community members were an 
integral part of the outbreak response.
Community partnerships All community members had knowledge of and 
were engaged in response activities (e.g., care 
of TB patients, education of co-workers, TB 
screening at the shelter, conduction of contact 
investigations) at their respective facilities.
The basics of TB and interpretation of 
genotyping information were important areas 
for education.
Training and education The assessment highlighted the importance of 
continued TB education and training in low-
incidence areas.
CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; TB, tuberculosis.BMC Public Health 2007, 7:307 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/307
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were used. As per standard operating procedures, the dis-
trict and state public information officers managed com-
munication efforts for the public, and the district
epidemiologists and state TB controller directed commu-
nication activities involving health providers. The labora-
tory group uses an alert system to convey urgent
information about communicable diseases, including TB,
to other laboratories; however, the system was not
deployed in this situation. The state TB controller alerted
public health personnel from jurisdictions within the
state and both the state TB controller and CDC represent-
ative communicated with TB program staff in other states.
According to the respondents, communication with the
public relied on written guidelines; however, communica-
tion within the governmental public health system used
an informal process.
The ORP
The importance of identifying and preparing key spokes-
persons and coordinating information activities via a writ-
ten communication plan is emphasized. This is especially
important when multiple jurisdictions within a state and/
or multiple states are involved. The ORP provides a TB
outbreak communication checklist and worksheet for
developing key public health messages, see Additional file
2.
Contributions by community members were an integral part of the 
outbreak response
The outbreak
All six community members were involved with various
aspects of the response. The physicians and infection con-
trol practitioners reported TB cases to the public health
district, cared for TB patients, advised about infection con-
trol, and educated co-workers about TB. One respondent
was involved in a contact investigation of patients and
employees exposed to an infectious TB patient at her insti-
tution. One respondent wrote an article about TB for a
staff electronic newsletter that was widely distributed. The
two homeless shelter employees participated by educating
clients and conducting a TB screening program.
The ORP
Partnerships with hospitals, private providers, and com-
munity groups, such as homeless advocates, are essential
to successfully reach persons with TB disease and infec-
tion. For example, health department staff may lose
patients because of social, cultural, and linguistic barriers.
The forging of partnerships can help overcome these
problems. The ORP reinforces the importance of sustain-
ing partnerships and provides a partial list of suggested
partner organizations.
The basics of tuberculosis and interpretation of genotyping 
information were important areas for education which emerged 
during the outbreak
The outbreak
Several community respondents expressed concern about
the risk of transmission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis from
transient individuals (e.g., migrant farm-workers and
homeless individuals), pointing to the need for further
education about TB transmission, the difference between
infection and disease, and cultural competency. Public
health respondents identified the use and interpretation
of genotyping data and basic TB education for non-TB
staff as their top training needs. (This information was
conveyed to the Francis J. Curry National TB Center, one
of four CDC-funded U.S. Regional Training and Medical
Consultation Centers, for consideration in preparing
future TB curricula. "Genotyping, practical applications
and interpretation" is now an educational offering).
The ORP
Education of TB program and other public heath staff,
community providers, and laboratory professionals
should be ongoing, but often needs to be specially
arranged during a TB outbreak. Resources are available
Definition of a tuberculosis outbreak Figure 1
Definition of a tuberculosis outbreak. CDC, Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention; CI, Contact investiga-
tion; TB, tuberculosis. (Figure1_Defintion_TB_Outbreak; 
pdf; Definition of a tuberculosis outbreak; box with defini-
tion).
A working definition of a potential “TB outbreak” is helpful for planning and response 
and may include any of the following criteria:  
Criteria based on surveillance* and epidemiology  
x An increase has occurred above the expected number of TB cases 
x During and because of a CI, two or more contacts are identified as having  TB 
disease,  regardless of their assigned priority, (i.e., high-, medium-, or low-
priority) 
x Any two or more cases occurring within one year of each other are discovered to 
be linked, and the linkage is established outside of a CI (e.g., two patients who 
received a diagnosis of TB disease outside of a CI are found to work in the same 
office and only one or neither of the persons was listed as a contact to the other) 
x A genotyping cluster leads to discovery of one or more verified transmission links 
which were missed during a CI within the prior two years  
Criteria based on program resources  
x Transmission is continuing despite adequate control efforts by the TB control 
program  
x CI associated with increased cases requires additional outside help 
* Regular review of TB cases; epidemiologic, program, and genotyping data; and 
findings from CIs BMC Public Health 2007, 7:307 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/307
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through CDC and the Regional Training and Medical
Consultation Centers.
Improvements to the ORP
Several respondents recommended including more infor-
mation in the section on evaluation and one respondent
suggested adding advice about what to do if a TB outbreak
is suspected. Based on these comments and additional
suggestions received during the field assessment, we
revised the ORP as follows: expanded the section on eval-
uation and added a checklist with questions, see Addi-
tional file 3; added "ten steps to take when a TB outbreak
is suspected", see Additional file 4; explained the reasons
why notification of TB outbreaks to CDC is important (for
the purposes of obtaining assistance and documenting
outbreaks as the U. S. moves toward TB elimination); sim-
plified the section on roles and responsibilities of partici-
pants in the outbreak response; emphasized the
important role of the public health laboratory in outbreak
response; added information on inter-jurisdictional com-
munication and data sharing; expanded the glossary; and
included a table of contents. The final version of the ORP
is described below.
The final outbreak response plan
Although, all real-time outbreak response activities were
reflected in the initial ORP, we incorporated many of the
suggestions for improvement into the final version of the
plan. The goals of the ORP are (a) to identify all outbreak-
associated cases; (b) to initiate contact investigations in a
timely manner; and (c) to identify infected persons for
evaluation of TB and ensure appropriate follow-up. The
ORP outlines in a concise manner the following elements
considered essential for recognition of and response to TB
outbreaks: definition of a TB outbreak; indications for ini-
tiating the plan; legal authority; composition of the
response team; procedures for notification and request for
assistance; local and state public health responsibilities;
data management; communication; training and educa-
tion; community partnerships; and evaluation [16]. In
addition, the ORP includes checklists for risk communica-
tion and evaluation, a glossary of outbreak-related terms,
and sections on "ten steps to take when a TB outbreak is
suspected" and "exceptional TB circumstances," situations
of sufficient concern to prompt activation of the ORP. The
"model tuberculosis ORP for low-incidence areas: a cus-
tomizable template [17]" and a customizable "TB pro-
gram manual template [18]" that presents national TB
control guidelines, including guidance on contact investi-
gation, for use in the field are available from the Francis J.
Curry National Tuberculosis Center.
Discussion
Our assessment of a TB outbreak response plan for low-
incidence areas demonstrates that (1) almost all the main
response activities were reflected in the plan; (2) the plan
added value by providing a standard TB outbreak defini-
tion and guidelines for response activities, in particular,
communication and evaluation, subjects for which a writ-
ten protocol was lacking during the actual response; and
(3) basic education about TB and the interpretation and
use of genotyping data were important needs. Stakehold-
ers suggested adding a section to the plan with specific
steps to take when an outbreak is suspected and an evalu-
ation checklist. Idaho public health staff indicated that
having a written ORP would be useful for future out-
breaks. A written ORP provides a systematic approach for
identification of outbreaks and coordination of the
response in any area, but it becomes critical in low-inci-
dence areas, where pubic health workers are usually "gen-
eralists" who work with several different programs (e.g.,
immunization and Women, Infants, and Children [WIC])
and may be less familiar with TB.
Our assessment had several strengths. First, we identified
and interviewed all major participants in this outbreak,
thus minimizing selection bias, an inherent shortcoming
of key informant interviews [14]. Second, we used trained
interviewers, who after establishing rapport, used careful
phrasing and probing techniques to encourage interview-
ees to explain the reasons for their statements. Third, two
interviewers independently identified and then compared
central themes. Finally, we validated central themes with
the state TB controller.
Our assessment also had limitations. A primary shortcom-
ing was the possibility of interviewer bias. Although, we
attempted to minimize bias by the use of trained inter-
viewers, nonetheless, we recognize this as a limitation of
key informant interviews [14]. Second, our findings are
based on the perceptions of participants, rather than on
objective methods. Third, by requesting feedback on the
ORP from a subset of public health professionals, rather
than the entire group, we may have missed ideas for
improving the ORP. And finally, we recognize the results
from this Idaho region may not be generalizable to other
areas. However, despite these limitations, we believe the
assessment led to improvements in the ORP as a custom-
izable tool for use by TB programs in other low-incidence
areas.
TB outbreaks pose immediate threats to the health of
communities and, over time, increase the number of indi-
viduals with latent TB infection who may later develop TB
disease. Often, there is a delay in recognizing outbreaks
and in responding effectively when they occur [16]. This
assessment identified the need for a standard TB outbreak
definition. Information from traditional epidemiologic
methods and newer genotyping data were both consid-
ered to be essential elements of the definition. In theBMC Public Health 2007, 7:307 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/307
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Idaho outbreak, district staff relied on epidemiologic
methods to trigger action, whereas state staff considered
genotyping matches to provide the clue that led to suspi-
cion of an outbreak. The use of genotyping data has been
shown to detect TB transmission events and help guide
public health interventions [19-21]. We propose a broad
definition of a TB outbreak, to provide guidance and dis-
cretion in deciding when to declare an "outbreak". In a
low-incidence area, we recommend setting a low thresh-
old for triggering the response and then deciding for each
instance whether a stronger response is warranted.
Ideally, we would have liked to conduct a formal evalua-
tion of the ORP by utilizing a post-intervention study
design. In this scheme, we would plan an intervention by
distributing the ORP across the region, holding training
sessions with local and state public health staff, and then
measuring how response activities changed – quantita-
tively and qualitatively – after the intervention. Although
there have been increased reports of outbreaks in low-
incidence areas, TB outbreaks are still a relatively rare
event. This type of evaluation will have to await the appro-
priate condition (TB outbreak) and when it occurs, should
be performed to continue to improve TB control and work
towards TB elimination.
Conclusion
In low-incidence areas, an ORP may be a useful manage-
ment tool that provides a systematic mechanism for rec-
ognition and response to TB outbreaks, planning for
additional resources, and prioritizing training. Feedback
from end users provided useful information for refining
this kind of tool. The assessment highlighted the impor-
tance of continued TB education and training in low-inci-
dence areas.
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